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The Inconveniences of
Transnational Democracy
Luis Cabrera*
W
hen then European Union Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy re-
turned from the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial
in Seattle, where gas-choked streets overflowing with tens of
thousands of protesters had signaled the emergence of a worldwide movement
against ‘‘corporate-led globalization,’’ he expressed support for broadening the
input taken on trade-rules formation. One lesson of the WTO’s failure to
launch a new round of trade talks, Lamy told his audience at the European
Parliament, was that the organization should consider ways to improve repre-
sentation, including proposals to create a WTO parliamentary body. Such a
body, even if purely consultative, could provide more avenues of access and
give greater legitimacy to WTO governance as the organization’s regulatory impacts
continued to expand.
1
Some six years later, Lamy, this time as WTO director general, spoke again to
a group of parliamentarians about the possibilities of adding another branch to
the organization’s governance. Here, the audience was the steering committee of
the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, whose globally dispersed member-
ship of national lawmakers has been pressing for greater inclusion and staging its
own informal parliamentary meetings at WTO trade talks since Seattle. Lamy
praised the parliamentarians as ‘‘crucial partners of the WTO . . . essential to en-
suring both the understanding and acceptance of the WTO at the national level;
and equally essential to tailoring new international obligations to domestic inter-
ests and needs.’’
2
And, though he encouraged Parliamentary Conference mem-
bers to continue issuing position papers and otherwise calling attention to
important trade-related issues informally, he was careful to note that any deci-
sion on their formal inclusion would require consensus from all of the nearly
* I would like to thank for their helpful comments Andrew Sabl, Christina Beltran, Loren King, Jamie
Mayerfeld, Thom Brooks, Christian Barry, Matt Peterson, Zornitsa Stoyanova-Yerburgh, and the anonymous
reviewers for this journal. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2005 meeting of the American
Political Science Association.
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150 WTO state members. This time, Lamy offered no explicit support for such
a move.
The shift should not be surprising. Indeed, if the director general had contin-
ued to press publicly for the formal inclusion of parliamentarians in WTO gov-
ernance, even in a consultative role, he would have been challenging the
organization’s long-standing core argument against broadening participation in
global trade governance. The argument, offered by the organization and numer-
ous academic defenders, rejects claims that the increasing impacts of the binding
trade rules negotiated at the supranational level on issues ranging from trade in
services, to intellectual property rights, to food safety and natural resource man-
agement should lead to greater participation by constituencies within states.
3
Rather, it holds that the current system of international trade negotiations, where
executive-branch delegations represent states’ interests in closed sessions, is ap-
propriately configured. More specifically, it holds that broader participation in
actual negotiations, by parliamentarians, nongovernmental organizations, or
others, would simply open the door to a destructive protectionism. It would fa-
cilitate rent seeking by powerful domestic interests, lead to significant distortions
in global trade liberalization, and could hamper WTO members’ efforts at realiz-
ing economic growth and greater prosperity.
The literature critiquing WTO transparency and accountability is large and
growing. Few commentators, however, have engaged directly with such ‘‘don’t
kill the goose’’ arguments against broader participation. This article explores
similarities between the claims of defenders of the WTO status quo and past ar-
guments for elitist forms of democracy, where strict limitations on the participa-
tion of ordinary citizens are advocated in the name of allowing leaders to
produce collectively rational policy outcomes. The arguments for the WTO sta-
tus quo are vulnerable to the same kinds of critiques that have been lodged
against elitist democracy arguments, and such external exclusions in general have
become increasingly problematic as the impact of WTO rules has grown globally.
Advocated here is the adoption of a broad principle of democratic symmetry in
WTO governance, under which the impact of the organization’s rules would be
more closely matched by the input afforded to affected constituencies within
states. Democratic symmetry could be a more demanding principle than others
put forth by commentators on WTO institutional reform.
4
It is flexible enough
in application, however, to guide the growth of suprastate participatory in-
stitutions in accordance with the reach of WTO rule-making authority. Over
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time, the observance of the principle could lead to the development of a parlia-
mentary assembly broadly similar to the current European Parliament, one ex-
ercising robust powers of codecision in WTO governance.
CURRENTWTO GOVERNANCE
Despite some steps toward greater openness taken by developed state members,
the World Trade Organization continues to operate primarily on what has been
described as the diplomatic ‘‘club model.’’
5
In the model, which emerged with
the Bretton Woods Institutions following World War II, power is delegated to
teams of issue-specific delegates meeting behind closed doors in a ‘‘club’’ of like
delegates to negotiate agreements on behalf of the people of a state.
6
Thus, trade
ministers are most prominent in GATT/WTO talks, finance ministers in the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, and so on. Participation in and public scrutiny of
the talks is limited in order to facilitate the often politically sensitive negotiation
of trade rules. There are disciplining mechanisms that can be brought to bear on
delegates in case of unsatisfactory outcomes, but the mechanisms are generally
triggered only ex post.
7
Some developed states have made limited moves to broaden their delegations
or take formal input from domestic stakeholders ahead of negotiations, in par-
ticular since the mass public protests at Seattle and at subsequent meetings in-
volving international economic institutions.
8
Following the Seattle ministerial,
European Union trade officials launched the Trade–Civil Society Dialogue meet-
ings in Brussels. At such meetings, NGO participants are given the opportunity
to share information with trade officials, air grievances, and offer advice. The
United States has broadened representation on its trade advisory committees,
and to a lesser extent on trade delegations, and it also has pressed for more trans-
parency in the adjudication of trade disputes within the WTO.
9
And the WTO
secretariat has begun publishing some meeting schedules, rulings, and docu-
ments related to trade disputes on its website. Despite such moves, however, the
WTO decision-making process remains essentially exclusive. Negotiating agen-
das, which detail the areas of global trade that will be targeted during talks, are
formed in a process that generally excludes both domestic interests and many of
the organization’s own lesser-developed member states. Participation in the for-
mation of rules is limited to member-state delegations, and again, often only to a
core of delegations in closed negotiations. In most cases, parliamentarians and
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other representatives of domestic constituencies are not formally empowered to
receive information or offer input as specific trade rules take shape during nego-
tiations, especially in states outside the core WTO ‘‘quad’’ of the United States,
the European Union, Canada, and Japan. Finally, though the standing WTO
Appellate Body has affirmed its own powers to accept amicus briefs in specific
disputes, there is no routinized procedure by which groups within states may
submit such briefs. Nor, with some few exceptions, has access to hearings in dis-
pute proceedings been permitted outside of disputant states’ delegations—a key
point for many, given that the WTO dispute system is the most clearly supra-
national aspect of the organization’s governance, where it has relatively strong
powers to obtain compliance from member states through the threat of
trade penalties.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST BROADER REPRESENTATION
Defenders of the status quo claim that opening the organization’s doors
could lead to more powerful protectionist pressures, especially from the domestic
‘‘losers’’—that is, producers who would face greater competition from overseas
rivals under trade liberalization. The organization has been effective in promot-
ing liberalization, they argue, because it has provided a venue in which member-
state delegations are able to resist pressures from organized producer lobbies,
as well as broader labor sectors, motivated to act in their own short-term, rent-
seeking interests. A club model enables trade elites to act in the more general
public interest, securing for their states the lower-priced goods and economic
efficiency gains that trade liberalization produces. As Fiona McGillivray argues,
Opening the WTO process to greater participation won’t necessarily make the WTO
more democratic. There are more winners than losers from free trade, but because the
costs and benefits are distributed unevenly, only the losers face strong incentives to or-
ganize and lobby the WTO. Most trade lobbyists seek protection, not open markets.
10
Thus, the argument goes, WTO negotiations should continue to be insulated
from voices outside the executive-branch trade delegations representing their re-
spective member states. That includes forms of direct participation by parlia-
mentarians within member states, who are seen as more susceptible to interest-
group capture, given the relatively small geographic areas they represent and the
direct influence that some local producer, labor, and other lobbies are expected
to exert on them.
11
Liberalization is presumed to be a political tough sell; though
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it may clearly be in the economic interest of a country overall, the local pains—
job losses in particular—and resulting pressures it can produce make it difficult
for even strongly supportive elective officials to persuade their local con-
stituencies of its benefit. As the organization itself states, ‘‘The WTO system of-
fers governments a means to reduce the influence of narrow vested interests. . . .
The outcome of a trade round has to be a balance of interests. Governments
can find it easier to reject pressure from particular lobbying groups by arguing
that [they] had to accept the overall package in the interests of the country
as a whole.’’
12
Influence on the WTO negotiations themselves is said to be appropriately ex-
ercised only through a principal-agent chain of delegation, beginning with citi-
zens of states, extending to their trade delegations and the negotiating tables.
Kent Jones and some other WTO defenders are not opposed to participation for
nongovernmental organizations in limited roles—for example, in disseminating
information to trade delegations ahead of negotiations, and possibly in submit-
ting amicus curiae briefs in some dispute-resolution proceedings. They argue,
however, that it would be inappropriate, as well as highly impractical, to attempt
to formalize NGO representation, and by extension parliamentary representa-
tion, in actual negotiations.
13
THE CLUB MODEL AND COMPETITIVE ELITISM
Some scholars have argued that it would be likewise inappropriate to presume
that democratic principles and practices can be exported from the domestic to
the regional or global level. They maintain that there simply are fundamental dif-
ferences between the democratic potential within a relatively cohesive nation-
state and the potential for shared rule above the state.
14
Such critiques generally
do not give sufficient consideration to the ways in which particular aspects of
democratic practice can be appropriately transformed and transferred to a supra-
national body. More salient here, they fail to address ways in which policy
formation in a body such as the WTO already resembles a long-standing and
still-influential approach to democratic practice: Joseph Schumpeter’s com-
petitive elitism.
15
Competitive elitism is concerned almost solely with outputs,
both electoral outputs and the policy outputs that determine electoral success or
failure for particular parties. It gives little emphasis to democratic inputs or
mechanisms for public participation in the policy-making process.
16
In fact, in
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Schumpeter’s formulation, policy-makers are to be insulated from public or in-
terest group pressures, in order to allow them to act in the interests of the polity
as a whole, rather than of the most vigorous or otherwise most influential inter-
ests. Thus, they are not to be barraged by telegrams, letters, and other forms of
direct lobbying on specific issues. As David Held observes, in this approach, ‘‘the
role of ordinary citizens is not only highly delimited, but it is frequently por-
trayed as an unwanted infringement on the smooth functioning of ‘public’ deci-
sion making.’’
17
In competitive elitism, if elites’ policy outputs should stray too far from the
preferences of the majority public, they or their parties are expected to be sub-
jected to the disciplining mechanism of electoral loss. The public plays a small
role beyond periodic voting, however. Thus, there are clear surface similarities to
the club model, where elites strictly control public participation in the process
and the public is left to judge outputs presented as a finalized, comprehensive
package. The WTO club model might actually be characterized as noncompeti-
tive elitism, though, because competition for public support of discrete party
programs is mostly lacking within it. Opposition elites face significant exclusions
at the suprastate level, as discussed below, and the kinds of disciplining mecha-
nisms expected to operate in competitive elitism are significantly attenuated in a
club model, where information about the formation of rules and their potential
impacts is more limited.
At a more foundational level, competitive elitism and the club model share a
feature that goes to the heart of accountability debates in global governance—that
is, both display some mistrust of a democratic polity’s capacity to act according
to its own rational, long-term interests. The dynamic is stark within classic com-
petitive elitism. In justifying limited public participation, Schumpeter cites in par-
ticular most citizens’ poor information on key issues.
18
He argues that they can
be expected to make rational decisions on clear pocketbook issues, but the ration-
ality employed will be of a narrow, self-interested kind, in contrast to the more
broad-minded rationality that elites employ. In a similar vein, defenders of a
WTO club model consistently emphasize that free trade is a hard sell. When it
comes to liberalization, it is difficult to persuade a polity to do what is in its own
best economic interests over the long term. As noted above, the ‘‘losers’’ from lib-
eralization tend to be concentrated in certain industries or economic sectors and
are considered more likely to mobilize in favor of specific protections than the
more dispersed ‘‘winners,’’ even though liberalization is presumed to be clearly in
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the national interest.
19
Thus, the voice that emerges from the polity is likely to be
one speaking on behalf of a short-term, self-interested rationality limited to a rela-
tively narrow group. In order to overcome protectionist pressures from such
groups, negotiations for trade liberalization ostensibly must be conducted at a re-
move from direct public input, where the influence of special interests will be
mitigated, and where collectively rational policy choices can be pursued.
20
The most damaging critique of the collective-irrationality assumption in com-
petitive elitism can be applied with some force to the argument for exclusive
WTO governance. Why, critics have asked of competitive elitism, if citizens are
so limited in their collective rationality, should we presume that they can be en-
trusted with the selection of their own leaders? Why allow even that exercise in
popular rule, which arguably has the most significant potential consequences of
any choice a polity can make?
21
Likewise, if the trade delegates appointed by
democratic states within a club model are to be insulated from public input so
that they can better act in the public’s own economic good, why should not a
range of other governance areas be removed from direct public input or special-
interest pressures as well? Surely such areas as taxation and redistribution policy
might be more efficiently managed if insulated from the rent-seeking and other
endemic pressures of domestic democracy.
Critics of competitive elitism have persuasively argued that the appropriate re-
sponse to a lack of information and the related problems that can contribute to
shortsighted democratic governance is not to undercut democracy itself. Rather,
such issues can be addressed through providing citizens with better access to
information and political education and encouraging more robust and varied
forms of participation and representation. Similarly, greater information and
participation are appropriate remedies for the challenges identified by defenders
of exclusionary WTO governance. In fact, it has been common for political elites
to work vigorously to ‘‘sell’’ trade liberalization agreements to the public when
such agreements are under consideration. For example, in 1993, shortly before the
U.S. Congress was to vote on the final passage of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, then U.S. vice president Al Gore engaged in a televised debate on the
measure with the prominent NAFTA opponent Ross Perot. In an inspired rhet-
orical moment, Gore gave Perot a framed portrait of U.S. congressmen Reed
Smoot and Willis Hawley, the primary sponsors of a protectionist 1930 trade act
that has been blamed for prolonging the global Depression. NAFTA went on to
win approval in Congress, after public opinion had gradually shifted in its favor.
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That shift was attributed by some observers to the vigorous information and
public relations campaign staged by the Clinton administration, and it has been
held up as an instance of a ‘‘rational public’’ emerging on a foreign policy is-
sue.
22
The episode helps to demonstrate that rather than viewing a retreat to su-
prastate elite policy formation as the only feasible response to potential collective
economic irrationality induced by a narrow protectionism, elites can respond by
providing public outreach and education in efforts to actually persuade the po-
tential beneficiaries of liberalization.
This is not to suggest that some form of fully populist direct democracy is the
appropriate end response. There may be justifications for very gradual inclusion,
or for continuing exclusiveness or opacity in some narrow range of policy pro-
cesses at the suprastate level, as is common in domestic democratic practice. Rela-
tively comprehensive, ongoing exclusion of public input into actual policy
formation is not readily justified by reference to the public economic interest, how-
ever, especially in a mature forum such as the nearly sixty-year-old GATT/WTO.
Finally, WTO trade negotiators are not as insulated from lobbying pressures
as the standard characterization of the club model would suggest. Select domestic
interest groups continue to exercise significant influence in WTO governance.
Persistently high tariffs and subsidies for agricultural goods, especially in developed
states, are an oft-cited example of producer influence.
23
In fact, the continuing
ability of farm lobbies in developed states to obtain trade-distorting agricultural
subsidies was cited as the primary reason for the suspension of trade talks under
the WTO’s Doha Round in July 2006.
24
Another example is the WTO Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Even staunch
WTO defenders, such as Jagdish Bhagwati and Kent Jones, are highly critical of
the influence that export producers were able to exercise in seeing TRIPs written
into trade rules.
25
It is not suggested here that the organization serves as a mere
transmission belt for export-producer interests in developed states. Such exam-
ples do suggest, however, that the WTO club model only partially insulates elites,
and that the interests of some rent-seeking producers are represented much more
robustly at negotiating tables than the interests of other societal groups.
DEMOCRATIC SYMMETRY
The changes recommended here are not some narrowly focused set of reforms
designed to reduce the influence of producer lobbies at the suprastate level, but
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more comprehensively inclusive reforms guided by a principle of democratic
symmetry. Such a principle holds that individuals should be able to influence
policy formation in proportion to the impact or potential impact the policy will
have on their lives.
26
The concept of symmetry is familiar in current liberal de-
mocracies, where individuals and groups have various means available to give in-
put on, and in some circumstances formally contest, legislative or administrative
proposals. Parliamentary committees routinely make specific provisions to take
testimony from potentially affected parties, individuals may directly petition law-
makers and bureaucratic rule-makers, and potentially affected groups may sub-
mit amicus briefs to juridical bodies in routinized procedures.
27
A similar input
principle, known as a ‘‘right to a fair hearing,’’ is recognized by the EU. In a 1974
decision addressing the powers of the European Commission to impose sanc-
tions and other penalties directly on individuals in unfair-competition cases, the
European Court of Justice ruled that ‘‘a person whose interests are perceptibly af-
fected by a decision taken by a public authority must be given the opportunity to
make his point of view known.’’
28
The court has since ruled that individuals who
might themselves be sanctioned in competition cases also have rights of access to
the information or documents on which the Commission’s decision will be
based, significantly enhancing the transparency of the decision-making process.
29
I do not claim here that democratic symmetry is fully realized in any domestic
system or the European Union. The influence of monetary contributions and
well-connected lobbyists, for example, can introduce numerous input asymme-
tries. The ability of individuals and groups to form their own interest-based lob-
bies and attempt to influence policy, however, or to press for formal checks on the
kinds of influence that can be exercised on the process, is an important potential
counterbalance.
30
Formal input mechanisms allow individuals to first identify and
publicize the set of interests they themselves consider to be vital, and then to at-
tempt to promote and protect those interests through participation in open fora.
Emphasis on the defensive nature of input principles of democracy dates at least to
John Stuart Mill’s oft-cited claim that ‘‘the rights and interests of every or any per-
son are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself
able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them.’’
31
Democratic theorists such
as Charles Beitz, Robert Goodin, and Ian Shapiro continue to focus on the ways in
which enabling inputs can help to publicize and promote the interests of groups
within society, especially potentially marginalized groups.
32
Shapiro in particular
discusses an ‘‘insider’s wisdom’’ in the domestic context. It is the special knowledge
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of a situation, role, or set of practices that only those embedded in the role can
fully appreciate and relate to others.
33
Those outside the specific role or social sit-
uation may have misconceptions about it that can be dispelled through dialogue
with insiders. In the WTO context, such insider’s wisdom could be crucial in
bringing to light some potentially harmful, or at least far-ranging, impacts of the
organization’s increasingly broad rule-making powers, as discussed below.
34
While the specific kind of input principle offered here is justified in part by its
role in enabling individuals to protect their interests, democratic symmetry is
primarily a deontological, rather than consequentialist, principle. That is, it is
not defended primarily by reference to some set of efficient correlations between
individual preferences and trade negotiations, or other outcomes that could be
produced, were it adopted. Indeed, there are no guarantees that outcomes would
always be more efficient or productive of some aggregate economic good under
the operation of democratic symmetry or some related input principle. Nor will
more equitable input necessarily lead to equitable political outcomes, whether in
the distribution of ruling power or specific material goods. Rather, democratic
symmetry is grounded in a fundamental concern with equal respect for in-
dividuals, expressed as political equality. To deny individuals the opportunity to
provide input on those policies that have significant impacts on their lives is to
severely limit their ability to contribute to various forms of public deliberation
about what they actually perceive their own good to be, to treat them funda-
mentally as subjects of rule rather than coproducers of it. I will note also that
democratic symmetry shares some features with deliberative democracy. Both
approaches place significant emphasis on creating inclusive spaces in the policy
process in which ideas and information can be exchanged.
35
Democratic symme-
try is not fundamentally or solely a deliberative principle, however. It gives rela-
tively less emphasis to the developmental and other ameliorative effects of
deliberation itself, and more to the importance of enabling individuals to give
substantive input on specific policy formation. Thus, under a symmetry appro-
ach, more formally constituted checks on governing power might be advocated
than under a primarily deliberative approach.
36
DEMOCRATIC SYMMETRYANDWTO GOVERNANCE
The body of World Trade Organization rules has been characterized by even
sympathetic observers as effectively a constitution for global commerce, one that
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is reaching ever deeper into domestic regulation and governance.
37
Consider the
following from the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, which has involved
lawmakers from scores of states and regional bodies. As noted above, for several
years the conference has been pressing for a greater inclusion of legislative voices
in WTO governance. In the Final Declaration of its 2003 conference in Geneva,
the group asserted that,
The WTO is rapidly becoming more than a mere trade organisation. Unlike most
international treaties, WTO agreements not only bind nations with regard to the
definition of common objectives, but also provide for their enforcement through an
effective dispute settlement mechanism. The WTO’s decisions have a growing impact
on services, utilities, intellectual property rights, government procurement, public
health, education, employment, food safety and the environment, as well as the man-
agement of natural resources such as forests, fisheries and water.
Numerous trade and international law scholars also have noted the increasing
breadth of WTO regulation and the penetration of the organization’s rules into
areas formerly reserved to domestic policy-makers. For example, Gopal Sreeniva-
san has detailed how the rules and procedures still emerging under the WTO’s
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) effectively require states to
maintain a minimum degree of privatization in domestic health care systems.
38
Likewise, the GATS has had broad significance for such issues as water-use regu-
lation and the preservation of water quality in member states worldwide, even
when administered at the very local level.
39
More generally, WTO dispute and
appellate panels routinely issue decisions that have direct effect on domestic pol-
icy areas. Initial accession to WTO membership itself can cause significant dis-
locations in domestic labor markets, agriculture, and other sectors.
40
WTO rules on intellectual property have been cited in particular for their
broad impacts and implications. The TRIPs agreement essentially required all
WTO member states to change their own laws and practices to comply with new
global standards for protecting patents, trademarks, and other intellectual prop-
erty. In states such as India, where patent protections on pharmaceutical prod-
ucts were formerly quite limited, and where production by ‘‘reverse engineering’’
of such products was common, the long-term impact from the country’s 2005
compliance with the agreement was expected to be quite significant.
41
In fact,
WTO negotiators themselves have acknowledged the impacts of TRIPs and have
revised the rules on patented drugs for diseases such as AIDS in developing
states. Critics complained that TRIPs could be a death warrant for huge numbers
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of HIV/AIDS patients who had been undergoing treatment with relatively low-
cost generic drugs. The agreement was provisionally modified in 2003 to allow
the distribution of generic copies of the drugs in some cases.
42
Some supporters of a club model do argue that increasing WTO impacts
should prompt some changes in WTO governance, though not in the direction of
including parliamentarians or otherwise creating formal participation mechanisms.
Rather, they suggest that some of the impacts on member states mentioned
above should be compensated, especially if they are felt deeply in less-developed
states. Bhagwati has been perhaps the most vigorous promoter of this kind of
compensation. One case he cites is the WTO Appellate Body’s 1997 decision to
bar the preferential banana-import treatment given by European Union states to
some of their former Caribbean colonies. He decries the lack of compensation in
that case as an example of the WTO acting with ‘‘reckless regard’’ for the econo-
mies of the developing states, which were ill equipped to withstand the shock of
the relatively sudden rules change.
43
Jones, in part as a response to such impacts
on developing states, advocates the creation of ‘‘clubs within the club,’’ or rotat-
ing steering committees of member states. Such committees would allow ‘‘WTO
members with common interests on any given issue at stake in the meetings to
enjoy the appropriate level of representation.’’
44
Note the similarity to a principle of democratic symmetry. Jones is con-
cerned with providing the appropriate kinds and levels of input to those who
stand to feel the impacts of policy changes. The continuing exclusions of devel-
oping states from agenda setting, core negotiations, and other aspects of WTO
governance indeed should raise significant concerns about fairness and repre-
sentation. The door has been cracked open to some more powerful developing
countries on specific negotiations, but the exclusion of especially the lesser de-
veloped of the developing countries remains the norm in negotiations. In the
increasingly important ‘‘mini-ministerials’’ held before full trade talks, it is
generally only the most economically powerful WTO members that meet to set
negotiation agendas. At full-scale trade talks, such as the November 2001
ministerial in Doha, Qatar, developing-country trade ministers have reported
an inadequate provision of translators during negotiations, including from
English to such widely spoken languages as Spanish and French. They have
complained that they are unable to adequately staff some important meetings
from their small delegations because of overlapping sessions and the marathon
character of some talks. Some have even reported being kept waiting in
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hallways while key, late-stage negotiations were conducted with a core of about
two dozen delegations.
45
Steering committee proposals offered by Jones and others would ensure at
least some representation at key negotiating sessions for developing countries.
46
Similar to bodies operating within the World Bank and the International Mone-
tary Fund, such committees would be composed of members according to trade
volume or some other characteristic that would reserve seats for the most prom-
inent trading states, while also providing for geographically based representation.
A sole focus on such internal reforms, as in Jones’s account, however, presumes
that states, in particular their executive negotiating delegations, are the only enti-
ties with legitimate standing in the WTO. Many domestic interests affected by
WTO rules see their interests only weakly represented within trade delegations,
which are appointed by, and primarily represent the interests of, the dominant do-
mestic political coalition. Within the current WTO framework, there are no mech-
anisms to ensure that domestic civil society critics, or indeed the voice of the
formal domestic opposition, will be heard at the suprastate level.
47
Further, more
direct participation by those outside of executive delegations would help to ad-
dress concerns about information asymmetries between negotiators and domestic
lawmakers. As Robert Howse notes, even if the governing coalition or party must
seek final approval from a domestic parliamentary body for a package of trade
rules negotiated in the WTO, the executive account of how and why delegates
agreed to particular rules in the process of negotiation can be difficult to verify in-
dependently.
48
Even in the United States, where Congress has a range of formal
oversight powers on trade policy, actual influence can be highly attenuated. As for-
mer U.S. Representative David Skaggs notes, ‘‘unlike most issues in the U.S. con-
stitutional system of divided legislative-executive power, there is no real
opportunity for a legislator to practice the legislative craft on trade bills. It is sim-
ply a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote on a bill that the executive has primarily shaped.’’
49
CREATING A FORMALWTO PARLIAMENTARY BODY
Beginning with the 1999 Seattle meeting, where a group of 120 issued a declara-
tion calling for the creation of a standing WTO parliamentary body, parliamen-
tarians have been vigorous and persistent in their calls for greater inclusion.
Their efforts have gained at least limited recognition from the WTO secretariat
and member states. WTO directors general have participated as speakers and
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moderators in various parliamentary conferences, as have trade ministers from
the United States, the European Union, Japan, and other powerful states. The
WTO also has staged large-scale informational workshops for parliamentarians,
in conjunction with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. The WTO
stance on a more formal integration of parliamentarians, however, could be well
summed up in Lamy’s June 2006 reminder to the conference steering committee
that ‘‘any greater involvement . . . will require consensus amongst WTO Mem-
bers, since as you know, the WTO is a member-driven organization.’’
50
Such a
requirement makes even strong WTO parliament advocates, such as the Thai
parliamentarian Kobsak Chutikul, reject as futile any proposals aiming to create
a body that could, in the near term, exercise some rules oversight or other pow-
ers analogous to domestic legislative bodies.
51
Certainly the prospects would seem dim for achieving consensus from all
WTO members in the near term. Even so, there are many steps that can be taken
to both increase parliamentarians’ influence and increase pressure on the organi-
zation to ultimately authorize a standing body. As Chutikul and others note, the
informal WTO Parliamentary Conference could play a greater role in monitor-
ing WTO rules formation and other activities, as well as engaging in dialogue
with executive-body trade delegations. Further, the emerging transnational net-
works of parliamentarians in the Parliamentary Conference could become more
integral to the transnational professional networks that have emerged around the
WTO and other global governance institutions in recent years. These mostly in-
formal networks of ministers, regulators, and jurists are increasingly significant
in promoting cooperation and the sharing of information and other resources
among states.
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Participation in such professional networks would help to in-
crease the competence of Parliamentary Conference members on trade issues, en-
abling them to exercise closer domestic scrutiny at the various stages of
negotiations. It also could provide informal channels of input for parlia-
mentarians in presenting the views of potentially excluded groups within their
states. A vital next step would be to move toward a more formal and represen-
tative structure for the Parliamentary Conference, even as it remains formally
excluded from the WTO. The conference could include representatives chosen
from each WTO member state, as well as a steering committee chosen from the
full body. The conference’s current, more ad hoc steering committee can serve as
a partial model. Further, if a standing WTO steering committee were formed
along the lines suggested by Jones and others, it could be expected to hold
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regular meetings with the parliamentary steering committee and provide oppor-
tunities for more informal consultation or cooperation.
I do not suggest that individuals within democratic WTO member states pos-
sess a categorical right to discover, through their elected representatives, the sub-
stance and dialogue of all WTO negotiations, adjudication, and other activities.
It is not uncommon even within states considered to be robust democracies for
citizens to be excluded from some aspects of governance. For example, in the
United States, cabinet-level administration deliberations are not made public,
and the transcripts of deliberations by the Supreme Court are not released. In
the WTO context, as is routine in many domestic systems, parliamentarians
could take part in closed briefings with negotiators about sensitive issues, still
providing input from their various constituencies, but observing confidentiality
on those highly sensitive issues where it might be justified. Parliamentarians also
could provide important ongoing pressures for openness and transparency,
helping to ensure that off-the-record proceedings are relatively rare and appro-
priately limited in scope.
Though the full inclusion of parliamentarians is advocated here, I do not call
for the formal inclusion of nongovernmental organizations in WTO rule-
making. Organizations such as Oxfam, Global Trade Watch, and Third World
Network have provided significant alternative voices on global trade governance,
and some commentators have suggested that their roles as information providers
and global gadflies should be formalized, whether on trade delegations, inside a
WTO assembly, or by other means.
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NGOs themselves, however, do not neces-
sarily conform to the standards of transparency and accountability that are de-
manded of international organizations. Many also represent relatively narrow
segments of domestic societies, and they tend to be concentrated in the global
North. For these reasons, NGOs are not recommended as the formal representa-
tives of affected constituencies within states. In a more inclusive WTO gover-
nance system, however, they still could play important roles as accredited
members of parliamentary advisory boards, speakers at open hearings, and as
sources of independent research and information for WTO parliamentarians,
delegations, and dispute-resolution panels.
In the longer term, we should want to see the creation of a WTO parliamen-
tary assembly that would exercise some robust powers of codecision in the or-
ganization’s governance. Specific powers could include a confirmation role in
the selection of new directors general and members of the WTO Appellate Body.
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Parliamentarians also would appropriately contribute to budgetary oversight, in-
cluding on WTO secretariat staffing levels, and in providing technical assistance
in compliance and dispute-resolution matters for developing states. Ultimately,
we should want to see parliamentary codecision approximate that practiced in
the still-evolving European Union system. The European Parliament has seen its
representation and delegated powers grow with the deepening of European eco-
nomic integration and concerns about a ‘‘democratic deficit,’’ where the input of
ordinary individuals into suprastate regional governance is presumed to have
fallen far short of its impacts.
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Members have been directly elected by citizens of
EU member states only since 1979. Since then, however, the Parliament has been
transformed from primarily a consultative body with few formal governance
powers, to a body exercising some powers of ‘‘cooperation,’’ or greater inclusion
in the scrutiny and acceptance of proposed legislation, to one possessing formal
powers of codecision—approval or rejection—with the Council of Ministers over
approximately three-quarters of EU-wide legislation proposed.
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The Parliament
also exercises significant budgetary powers, and now possesses a veto power over
the selection of the European Commission president.
The enhancement of European Parliament powers has not, of course, ad-
dressed all the concerns about accountability and transparency in EU gover-
nance, and I do not suggest that the European model can be adopted wholesale
for the WTO. Key aspects of EU evolution certainly can inform a discussion
about the possibilities for a more representative WTO, however, especially
as WTO-regulated trade continues to expand. As Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne
Sandholtz, James Caporaso, and others have detailed, increases in trade and
other transstate exchanges facilitated by economic integration projects tend to
create movement toward deeper integration, especially via dispute-resolution
procedures. As cross-border economic activity intensifies and expands, formally
adjudicated disputes increase in number, and system-wide precedents are set by
dispute bodies, as in the ‘‘fair hearing’’ case noted above.
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As the body becomes
more integrated and its governance reach expands and deepens, affected actors
tend to press more vigorously for inclusion in formal decision-making proce-
dures. We can already see this happening in the WTO. Developing states are
demanding greater inclusion in negotiations and have been increasingly vocal
about their displeasure with developed states’ slow movement toward reducing
agricultural subsidies, among other issues. In response to such demands, it seems
likely that a member-state steering committee will be created, or that the WTO
234 Luis Cabrera
will take some other formal steps to better incorporate developing-state voices.
More significantly, continuing pressure for more accountability and transparency
in WTO rule-making can be expected from affected actors within member
states—notably, the street protesters and NGOs whose actions have provoked
global debate about WTO governance and have helped trigger even the limited
moves toward openness noted above.
Ideally, such pressure can be channeled into calls for inclusion and robust rep-
resentation, rather than into blunt ‘‘nix it’’ campaigns of resistance to virtually
all trade liberalization. Such resistance campaigns, in conjunction with a poten-
tial backlash or defections from developing states, could indeed have the poten-
tial to ‘‘kill’’ the WTO goose. That is an outcome that defenders of the club
model would do well to keep in mind as they consider ways to help the organiza-
tion realize its promise for promoting genuinely beneficial trade liberalization.
The creation of a formal WTO parliamentary assembly, even if only consultative
at first, would amplify the voice of global civil society in trade negotiations con-
siderably, providing new avenues of access and some influence. It would make
the concerns of those within WTO member states more visible, enabling them to
more effectively share their insider’s wisdom and better publicize and protect
their vital interests. The gradual strengthening of a WTO assembly, with the lon-
ger-term goal being the creation of a body that could exercise codecision powers
roughly analogous to those of the current European Parliament, would go some
way toward fully matching input to impact in WTO governance.
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